The meaning of Allama Khadim Rizvi
Did Jinnah ever say that Pakistan will be a Muslim laboratory? If not, why is it one of his most quoted quotes and why has it been included in our study guides? Is it because our rulers have used a good portion of their power to transform Pakistan into the Frankenstein workplace, and to successfully claim the legitimacy of the founder of the nation after death?
Over the past forty years, we have produced all kinds of sipah and lashkar but one thing, one important thing, was missing and now we have it in the form of Tehreek-e-Labaik Ya Rasul Allah (TLYR), carrying the flag. violent, strong Barelvism. (We had a Sunni Tehreek based in Karachi but Karachi is very far from Islamabad). This new beauty born at the confluence of Rawalpindi and Islamabad can prove to be a greater challenge to Pakistani society than any other religious garment because of its roots in society.
Over the past few decades, an educated Pakistani middle class has created a naïve narrative based on the violent Saudi influential Wahabi / Deobandi Islam and the peaceful traditional Sufi / Barelvi. Such a distinction, though completely beyond comprehension, is a major problem. Deobandi Islam is strongly influenced by Sufi culture and the Barelvi sect cannot be compared to Sufi Islam. Wahabi Islam has existed in Saudi Arabia since the middle of the eighteenth century without creating a military threat to society.
Those who try to find sources of violence in their ideas often bark at the wrong tree. Any ideology, religious or secular, can be distorted to create social unrest. What could be more peaceful than reconciling man to God? All religions and all Islamic sects are naturally peaceful. However, no major religion has ever been able to harm people and themselves.
The Sajjada Nasheens (guardians of the sanctuaries), whom we associate with the Barelvi sect today have for many years been active in politics, forming alliances with rulers and, at times, opposing them. Many of them also play an important role in the organization of Pakistan. However, as an integral part of the traditional rulers, they did not take part in any political party. With the change of political spirits, they have changed their individual political alliances.
The power of Sajjada Nasheens undermined Barelvi's politics in Deobandi's religious politics. Deobandi's religious leadership is in the hands of middle-class theologians who are often the masterminds of big dressahs. Their power is in their dress. Therefore, they are always looking to expand and expand the network of seminars and students.
TLYR can be seen as a movement based on the Barelvi madressahs and poses a direct challenge to the power of Sajjada Nasheens. Khadim Hussai Rizvi grew up in various madressahs and still earns Rs15000 in a Muslim area where he works as a kateeb (mother of Friday prayers). The party was born as a madressah in Lahore as an organization working for the liberation of Mumtaz Qadri. Allama Rizvi openly expresses his hatred for the rich Sajjada Nasheens and their depraved children. It is not surprising that all government efforts to influence him through the powerful Sajjada Nasheens have failed during the recent dharna.
Khadim Hussain Rizvi and his party found sympathy with the Pakistani social class that was left untouched by the PTI political activists and were dissatisfied with the support politics of other parties. In many ways, Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi can be compared to Imran Khan. Although Imran Khan brought together middle-class educated people to express their frustration, Maulana Rizvi compiled a lower, middle-class class of religiously inclined workers. In other words, he included part of what Guy Standing, a professor of SOAS, called the precariat. According to him: "In short, the precariat lives in economic uncertainty, often in endless debt, where a single shock, a wrong decision or an illness can put them on the brink of extinction, social isolation and possibly abandonment. Public illness or premature death."
Both of these political parties are emerging from a rapid transformation in Pakistani society as well as deep-rooted psychological and economic fears based on globalization. Both parties have incorporated their supporters into their system, undermining support politics and customer love, although the PTI had to return to support politics in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Both 3G groups as they rely heavily on social media to convey their simple but extremely powerful narrative. Perhaps Allama Rizvi has more confidence in social media than Imran Khan, as the mainstream media is often reluctant to broadcast his speeches for language reasons.
Rizvi's social agenda is not a priority, but emphasizes the message of social equality and the responsibility of the state to meet the needs of the poor. You find all the solutions to every possible problem (power consumption). In his words, all evil can be solved by putting religion in power - that is, giving power to the Ulama. In this he is like Islamists like Jamaat-e-Islami leaders and jihadi leaders like Hafiz Saeed of Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Imran Khan is referring to a small, anonymous and corrupt ruling party. He describes these elites as a few hundred politicians. In Rizvi, all politicians and the upper echelons are all accused of religion including the "Jewish bridegroom", Imran Khan.
Allama Rizvi moved the pillars of the state and always feared anyone who supported the beard and hat. Worse still, some Pakistani ruling elites may still be actively using religion in their internal conflicts. With a vulnerable and besieged government in power, a government official is in trouble. The bureaucracy is already on the brink

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